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The moot question is: “Can economics be a Physical Science?” I would rather ad-
dress a more general question: “Can economics or sociology avoid joining Natural
Science?”
The answer of course depends on how we look at sociology or economics. Are
they going to remain prescriptive as part of ethics (as often in political economics,
or as social norms evolved through the history of the human kind) or they aspire
to be a meaningful “tool” or “model” to comprehend the social dynamics and be
useful to “engineer” the social dynamics when needed.
Epistemologically, our knowledge about truth can be either deductive or in-
ductive. Mathematics is an usual example of the deductive knowledge (though
not all of it can be deduced from axiomatic logic). Mathematical truths do not
necessarily require any laboratory test or supports from “observations” of the
“nature” to prove or validate them. Linguistically it is like the tautology “A
bachelor does not have wife”; one need not check with each and every bachelor to
confirm the statement – first part of the sentence confirms the second. The same
is true about the statement “two plus two equals four”. Mathematical truths are
analytical truths, and mathematics therefore is not generally considered to be
an empirically founded science, though it has been historically considered as the
“mother’ of all natural sciences. Mathematics is employed as a condensed form of
the (deductive) logic, and as such, does not by itself reveal any new truth about
nature (Whitehead and Russell, 1910, 1912, 1913; see also Kneebone, 2001).
Natural sciences, however, are basically inductive in origin, based on natural or
laboratory observations. The statement “The sun rises every twenty four hours
on the east” is not a tautology or analytical truth. Though east may be defined
as the direction of sun-rise, that it rises every twenty four hours, is an inductive
(or empirically observed) truth, and therefore tentative (not like mathematical
truths). The tools of mathematics and logic are employed to find and establish
relationships among these observations, sometimes with the help of a common
(abstract) hypothesis about the functioning of the nature (see e.g., Russell, 1967).
Mathematics has played, and still plays a significant role in developing the
consistency logic in any natural science. This is particularly true in physics. In
chemistry and biology, its role is gradually being replaced by (linguistic) logic.
Even in physics, there are increasing replacements by (gate based) computer al-
gorithms or Boolean logic. There are even arguments that a new kind of (natural)
science will be developed soon and will replace all our mathematics and linguis-
tic logic by computer algorithms (Wolfram, 2002). Even when the mathematics
is employed as the major tool in developing any natural science, as in physics,
it is considered as applied mathematics; it does not generally contribute to the
development of mathematics, as done by the mathematicians. Hence, even math-
ematical physics need not be confused with mathematics itself! Novel applications
of mathematics do not lead to any success in physics unless it builds on empirical
facts and leads to predict or engineer other empirical facts. Also, approximate
mathematical solutions in the intermediate steps to comprehend the nature are
most welcome (see e.g., Stanley, 2013; Weatherall, 2013). Even at its best, such
intermediate analysis is just applied mathematics, and not (pure) mathematics.
The same should be true for mainstream economic theories today. They do not
by themselves contribute to the development of mathematics or to the develop-
ment of economics as science, unless these (applied) mathematics comes at the
intermediate stage to take us to the predictable set of empirical truths from the
(base) set of observed truths.
Major use or application of one field to another never leads to identity: In
any concert, many instruments are used, including the sound system, which is
common. This never suggests identification of the concert with the sound system!
More seriously perhaps, most concerts employ a piano or a harmonium whose
players play key roles. Yet, the main conductors of the concerts may not be those
players, nor even players of those instruments! Applied mathematicians need not
be identified either as (natural) scientists or as (pure) mathematicians! These
mistakes can be costly: “I suspect that the attempt to construct economics as an
axiomatically based hard science is doomed to fail” (Solow, 1985).
These quantifiable links between the seemingly often unrelated observations
help to identify the generic truths of nature and form the basis for comprehension
of the scientific (observational) laws. However, the perception and comprehen-
sion of truth can be partial and incomplete. A proverbial Indian story (Buddhist
Udana) depicts a few blind people touching different parts of an elephant: the
trunk, tusk, leg, tail etc., and interpreting them as different animate or inani-
mate objects depending on their own perceptions, ideas or experience. Physi-
cists, chemists, biologists, all tend to do the same. Economists or sociologists
tend to make the same mistake more dramatically! In all its various manifesta-
tions, inanimate, biological or sociological, mother nature perhaps employs the
same elegant truth code, the gene, which gets suppressed partially and expressed
differently in the various parts of her body. Scientists having different perspec-
tives in mind perceive them differently. Mother nature hardly cares whether we
call them physics or chemistry or biology, or for that matter, economics or sociol-
ogy. The generic truth established therefore in one branch of natural science (say,
in physics) should not be invalid in another (say, in chemistry or biology) and
the same should hold true for economics if viewed as another branch of natural
science (Chakrabarti, 2013).
As argued earlier, mathematics in itself can not lead to any satisfactory the-
ory or model of any natural system, unless the theory or the models are based
on hypotheses connected to some observations. Even approximate and tentative
attempts to connect various observations, employing (deductive) logic or math-
ematics can lead eventually to a successful theory or understanding about the
nature. And that can be utilised to predict or suggest desired outcomes in differ-
ent contexts, leading to successful and much desired engineering. Natural sciences
therefore start with observations and end in observations; in the middle it grows
in successive stages as the tentative models and theories try to accommodate
more and more of the observations or data in more elegant and comprehensive
way. Indeed, “lots of fields use mathematical models to understand the world.
But physicists have a particular way of thinking about approximation and ide-
alization. To make progress on interesting problems, physicists always have to
make assumptions and approximations” (Weatherall, 2013), allowing respective
engineering. In my mind, the mainstream economics is paying a heavy price
of making this mistake, by refusing to address the social engineering problems!
There are of course some skepticisms regarding the success of mechanical mod-
els of individual’s economic activities, arguing that the economic agents, unlike
particles, incorporate the anticipated future prospects of their move into their
dynamics. This argument, however, does not stand on closer scrutiny: These
anticipated prospects can in fact be formally incorporated in their utility mea-
sures, which each one intends to maximize for future returns. Many of the specific
forms of the utility functions on the other hand have been identified as precise
equivalents of the thermodynamic entropy related to the collective dynamics (see
e.g., Chakrabarti et al., 2013), and the entropy maximization gives the time ar-
row or direction of the future in the collective dynamics. Another important
point against such social engineering, some of which had been attempted earlier,
comes from the adaptive change in the behaviour of agents in response to the
past attempts (of such engineering). This is a more difficult problem, though not
insurmountable: Hopfield-like adaptive brain models are now quite established in
science and technology (see e.g., Hertz et al., 1991) and similar adaptive social
learning models for Minority Games and similar collective adaptive problems are
being formulated and studied extensively these days (see e.g., Chakraborti et al.,
2015).
Economics, apart from its inappropriate wisdom to become a hard science with
exclusive axiomatic or mathematical foundations, also suffers from its seemingly
immediate practical ambition of policy prescriptions under the garb of political
economy. In absence of any real science of economics which can be implemented
for any kind of social engineering, this high-handed prescriptions create even
more problems. The historical origin of the concept of inviting the involvement
of politics or the government in individual’s economic activites derives from the
mercantile experience in the colonial days. British merchants, who would even
set prices on their own terms in colonies like India, observed growing instabilities
or unemployement in their home market in years whenever there was a net trade
deficit (export less than import, leading to a net outflow of gold). Mercantiles
prescribed involvement of the government (third party) to introduce taxes on
import to control the loss of effective demand resulting from the “laissez-faire” of
otherwise free individual traders or economic agents. Political economy was born
to adovocate such appropriate measures. Later, this was further strengthened by
the “Keynesian prescription” (Keynes, 1936) of fiscal measures by the government
to curb the loss of effective demand or slump and the increased unemployment.
In absence of any real foundation, one does not know when such prescriptions
work and when not (see e.g., Harcourt and Kriesler, 2013). Even with such great
insights and intentions, economics has failed so far to comprehend the social
instabilities. The appointments of powerful finance ministers (with completely
different level of assignments for the science ministers, who can never participate
at any such root level) by the respective governments perhaps further worsen the
situations all over the world! These also suggest some major reviews are needed
for developing “science of economics” urgently.
As mentioned above, mainstream economics today hardly cares for the sub-
ject’s success in applications or social engineering. This has led to the recent
upsurge of some heterodox approaches, including Econophysics. Econophysics
(term coined in 1995 in a conference on statistical physics in Kolkata; see e.g.,
Rosser, 2008; Stanley, 2013) views the problems of economics in a physical way
and attempts to solve them employing the techniques of physics. Indeed, viewed
more generally, it tends to believe that the dynamical aspects of the societies and
of the markets in particular are purely physical in origin and nature, in contrast
to the academic belief in economics that the complete economic world can be
understood based on axiomatic logic.
Mark Twain (1883) noted long back “There is something facinating about
science. One gets such wholesale returns of conjecture out of such a trifling
investment of fact.” The knowledge and truths of social sciences like economics
can only be fact-based or inductive like in physics or other natural sciences, where
deductions or logical derivations, correlating various empirical observations, are
essential for their comprehension, organisation and growth. But that need not be
mistaken to be an indication for an essentially deductive science, where logical
elegance or mathematical beauty can dictate the truth! Just like biophysics or
biochemistry (each borrowing established knowledge i.e. truths from the parent
subjects like physics or chemistry to develop biology), econophysics can help to
develop economics utilizing the knowledge borrowed from physics which, being
the oldest and most established of all the natural sciences, can offer a major
helping hand. Hence the inevitability of econophysics.
Auguste Comte (1856) had already advocated for “Social Physics” more than
a century and half ago. Pioneering arguments in favour of modelling social sci-
ences in the mould of physical sciences have recently been reiterated forcefully
by several scientists: See for example, Schelling (1971), Galam et al. (1982),
Mantegna and Stanley (1995, 1999), Stauffer et al. (2006), Kirman (2010) and
Galam (2012). Indeed there are several recent comments and discussion-notes
written by economists and social scientists, clearly saying “No” in response to
the question posed in the title of this paper: “Ongoing work inspired by statisti-
cal physics shows that relatively simple models with plausible behavioural rules
have the potential to replicate key empirical regularities of financial markets”,
wrote Lux and Westerhoff (2009) on commenting about the failures of main-
stream economics in comprehending the 2007-2008 global economic crisis, while
in responding to some criticisms on the statistical methodolgies of economics ex-
periments, the use of which are growing extremely fast in the current economic
theory literature, a recent Editorial Note (2016) entitled ‘A far from dismal out-
come’ in The Economist writes “Natural scientists may have to stop sneering
at their economist brethren, and recognise that the dismal science is, indeed, a
science after all.”
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